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The Temporal Aesthetics of Cindy Sherman’s Photography:                        
Revisiting the “Centerfolds” as Single-Frame Cinema 
             
James M. Magrini 
 
 
I. Introduction: Purpose and Methodology  
 
Cindy Sherman was originally commissioned to produce Centerfolds by Ingrid Sischy for Art 
Forum. They were ultimately rejected by the editor because of the ambivalent and contradictory  
nature of the photos. In more accessible terms, Cindy Sherman’s photographs were rejected in 
great part due to their tendency to evoke the idea of violence against women, i.e., “women-as-
victims,” women as both physical and psychological casualties of love (eros). It is indeed 
possible to legitimately read many of the photographs in terms of their potential to perpetuate, 
for aesthetic effect, the egregious cultural stereotype of females as vulnerable and subservient 
underlings to their superior male counterparts, all of whom remain conspicuously absent from 
the frame. 
 Despite the unfavorable decision of Art Forum to refrain from publishing the photos, 
Sherman went on to display the series of oversized photographs (2 X 3 feet) at New York’s 
Metro Pictures (November 7-28, 1981). The reception they received at that time was captured 
nicely by Lisa Phillips, who described them as “shocking, seductive, and controversial” (Phillips 
2003). Today, this collection of photos seems as visceral and alive as ever, for they continue to 
enthral and bewitch us. Why do they remain so provocative, meaningful, and powerful more than 
two decades after their original unveiling? For what reasons do they continue to sustain our 
interest as spectators, art lovers, and critics of art? In what follows, I  provide several responses 
to these queries by arguing that Sherman’s work gathers its meaning and acquires its power to 
move and inspire us because her photography is analogous to the art of cinema.  
 In what follows, I will read her photography as a type of art that acquires the ability to 
communicate when understood within the context of film conceived as an integrated system of 
codes woven seamlessly into a text that inspires the processes by which meaning is produced, 
established, and controlled. Therefore, I adopt a two-pronged approach in order to first, 
understand the notion of “meaning” as it applies specifically to Sherman’s art of photography, 
and second, to explicate and analyze the elements that are unique to the production of film, most 
specifically classic narrative cinema, which Sherman readily incorporates into her work. 
Although analyzing the “classic” story-film, I will de-emphasize the strict relationship of film to 
reality (realism) and focus instead on the underlying structures governing the production of 
meaning, which includes the analysis of the phenomenon of spectatorship that emerges, i.e., 
Sherman’s relationship to her postmodern audience as participants in the meaningful and 
pleasurable experience of her art.      
  
II. Cindy Sherman’s Photography as Art in the “Temporal” Context of Classic Hollywood 
Narrative Film  
 
1. The Cinematic Elements of Sherman’s Photographs 
 
When Sherman’s work first came to the attention of the art world, she portrayed actresses from 
nonexistent films (Untitled Film Stills, 1978). Importantly, beyond merely paying homage to the 
cinema, the collection of photographs played directly on the viewer’s acquired cognition for 
interpreting and understanding the images of mass media. Sherman demonstrated that when her 
imaginary Hollywood female leads were lit and dressed in a ceratin manner, positioned within 
fabricated sets, or tableaus, in order to create a photographic analogue to the mis-en-scene and 
mis-en-shot, the cinematographic elements designating the filmed events within Classic film, the 
women were immediately identifiable as representing iconic “feminine types,” or archetypes, 
from the silver screen. 
 Thus, the idea of Sherman simultaneously assuming the personae of photographer, 
actress, costume and lighting designer, and director (a virtual protean “filmic” artist) is familiar 
to those who know her work. Peter Schjeldahl is but one of several insightful critics who have 
suggested the relation between Sherman’s photographs and modern cinema, with its unique set 
of production techniques, cinematic aesthetics, and signs and codes, which are also associated 
with production and the apparatus of cinema. Since  Schjeldahl’s remarks are relevant, they are 
reproduced in full. In what follows, he speaks exclusively about the style and form of the 
photography Sherman employs in Centerfolds.  
  
  This is photography as one-frame moviemaking. The pictures feature widescreen 
proportions (2 X 4 foot), high-angle midshot compositions, “classy” 
cinematographic lighting, punched up color, and the look of Method acting. The 
subtlest and most effectively cinematic technique is the way of framing that does 
not crop expressively, as is usual in photographs, but functions as the passive 
container of the complete fictionalized reality (or real fiction), a world in a-
rectangle that addresses itself directly to the imagination. Film aesthetics seem to 
me far more about this kind of charged containment than about, say, motion 
(Schjedahl 1990). 
 
Schjeldahl’s observations are correct in that these cinematic techniques that Sherman employs in 
the photographs give the impression of single-frame cinema, and further, that each of these 
aspects of film production (e.g., lighting, framing, cinematography, the use of tableau - the so-
called “micro properties” of film production), all unique to the medium of film, work to foster 
the understanding of Sherman’s women as characters in imaginary films.  
 When employing the term “motion,” Schjeldhaul is undoubtedly referring to the literal 
movement of the subjects in the photographs, e.g., the technique of capturing the blurred 
movements of the subjects, capturing them in the midst of moving from one spacial location 
(within the tableau) to another, a technique that Sherman obviously avoids. However, while 
focusing on this obvious conception of motion, Schjeldhaul overlooks outright the idea of motion 
conceived in an even more important sense with respect to meaning and the cinema, i.e., the 
“movement” associated with plot and story, or the narrative structure of the film and the film’s 
narration. Therefore, what Schjeldahl and other critics neglect to consider is perhaps the most 
important mechanism responsible for meaning at work in Classic Hollywood cinema: the 
element of temporal movement linked with the film’s overarching narrative structure, and 
indeed, Sherman is undoubtedly referencing the genre of the Hollywood story-film.  
 Importantly, in the discipline of narratology, such film theorists as Tzvetan Todorov have 
suggested that the narrative structure of the film is not simply another code interwoven within 
the text, but rather represents the overarching principle of order, a macro property of the film’s 
production, which is necessary for the integrated system of signs and codes to function 
efficiently in the first instance. As argued by contemporary film theorist Dudley Andrew, beyond 
a mere tool for the cinema, “narrative” is a human capability that allows us to understand the 
world of which we are a part, as a system of reference relations and meanings. 
   
Over and over in the study of cinema the issue of narrative arises not simply 
because it has been the historically dominant mode of cinema production, but 
because it is above all a tool for conceptualization, a logic determining meaning 
(Andrew 1984).      
  
 In order to understand the manner in which Sherman’s photos speak to the spectator, 
cinematic motion, in terms of the “movement” of the film’s story and plot (i.e., events occurring 
in succession, driven by the logic of cause and effect, within the compressed temporal locus of 
the manufactured world of the film) must be addressed. However, prior to detailing the manner 
in which Classic Hollywood cinema functions to produce meaning as related to Sherman’s 
photographs, I examine the medium of photography by briefly outlining Roland Barthes’ 
influential critique in Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. According to Barthes, the 
experience of viewing a photograph opens the spectator, in a moment of ecstatic displacement, to 
a unique mode of temporality that differs from the everyday notion of chronology, or linear 
progression of time, which includes the familiar understanding of the temporal moments of past, 
present, and future. 
  
2. Barthes, Heidegger, and Sherman: The Time of the Kairos 
 
In Camera Lucida, Barthes does not seek to explicate the semiology of the photograph, rather he 
argues an ontology of the medium by describing, in a phenomenological manner, the essence of 
the photograph. Three components are present to his analysis of the photograph: the studium, the 
punctum, and Time (a notion of time in which the past is privileged). The concepts of punctum 
and Time are of critical importance to this study, while the studium, being concerned with the 
photos presentation of reality, as might be related to cultural interest and historicity, represents 
something of a peripheral concern, in that Barthes places far more emphasis on the last two 
components in his analysis. These aspects of Barthes’ study deal specifically with the “pleasure” 
of the photograph (jouissance) and the event of “the kairos of desire,” which suggests that the 
object in the photograph references and gives precedence to a specific mode or moment of 
temporality above all others. 
 The punctum is at once associated with desire, surprise, and wonderment; it is that which 
is added by the spectator to the photograph, but it is also that element of the photograph which is, 
according to Barthes, “nonetheless already there” (Barthes 1981). The pleasure of the photograph 
evokes a transcendence beyond the immediate text, it is the moment of an unexpected, intense 
flash (kairos) that takes hold of the spectator, interrupting a passive, disinterested, and 
uninvolved reading of the text, and, in an “ecstatic” moment of rapture, transports the spectator 
beyond the traditional modes of cognition and the everyday manner of understanding time as a 
chronological phenomenon.  
 According to Barthes, the photographic referent, the essence of the photo, lies in the fact 
that is refers the object in the photograph for the spectator to the past, as manifest and residing in 
the time that is gone, the time that is no more, which has been captured for posterity by the 
photographer. For Barthes, what we experience in the moment of the kairos is unlike what we 
might experience when encountering a great work of art, such as a painting, which might include 
an ecstatic experience in which the spectator is temporally projected into a “hopeful” or unique 
future. Such a notion of fine art is espoused by Aristotle in Poetics, wherein he writes of the ideal 
portrait painters, whose greatness is measured by the way they portray the human not as she is, 
but as she ought to be. Against this notion, Barthes states explicitly that the encounter with the 
photograph (as referent) and the subsequent experience is, “not a memory, an imagination, a 
reconstitution, a piece of Maya, such as art lavishes upon us, but reality in a past state at once the 
past and real”(Barthes 1981).     
 The essence of the photograph is neither its status as a work of art, nor its ability to 
communicate in a symbolic or allegorical manner truth or knowledge. Rather, according to 
Barthes, its essence is restricted exclusively to its effectiveness to “reference.” This distinguishes 
photography from the other arts such as painting and cinema and other forms of discourse 
relying on representational imagery. However, with respect to Cindy Sherman as a photographer, 
this notion undoubtedly requires reassessment, it is necessary with respect to her work as an 
artist, to rethink Barthes’ conception as presented in Camera Lucida, for Sherman is, first and 
foremost an artist, who happens to work in the medium of photography. It is Sherman’s status as 
artist that separates her from the type of photography, or the essence of the type of photography, 
that Barthes analyzes, whose images (objects) reference a reality firmly located in the past. Such 
a notion of Sherman as photographic artist, against Barthes interpretation of the essence of the 
medium, is expressed eloquently by critic Lisa Phillips, “Through her method and approach to 
making pictures, Sherman exposed the myth of the photograph as index of the real” (Phillips 
2003).   
 How is it possible to rethink Barthes notion of time in the kairotic moment of the 
punctum as it relates to the form of temporality that Sherman’s photographs evoke? I argue that 
Sherman’s photos refer neither to a time of the past nor “real” time as experienced in our every 
day waking moments, but rather the experience of her Centerfolds opens the spectator unto the 
artificial temporality that is consistent with the experience of the compressed, manufactured time 
of narrative cinema, time as re-presented within the mimetic spectacle of film. Briefly examining 
the etymology of the term kairos will shed light on the issue.         
 For Barthes, time is discernable in terms of the kairos, which is a moment referencing 
specifically the time of the past. As stated, it is an ecstatic moment in which the spectator, 
“stands out” of the moment of the present. Transcending the everyday ways of experiencing the 
world, she is transported to another time. Kairos in the Greek has a variety of meanings and 
applications, but it is perhaps understood most readily in philosophical circles as it relates to 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics (Nicomachean Ethics) wherein kairos means “the right time,” or decisive 
moment of action. It is the moment when the “one who deliberates well,” the phronemos, 
comports to the ethical situation in a moral manner, the instant when dilemma, deliberation, 
choice, and action merge. For Aristotle, the kairos is associated with the time of the  nun, i.e., the 
time of the “now,” or present.     
 Heidegger, in Being and Time, also incorporates the understanding of the kairos and 
reinterprets this Aristotelian concept when philosophizing his notion of ecstatic temporality, the 
moment in which the human is thrust into its authentic relationship with time, as time. It is the 
instant when we are opened up to the elliptical configuration of time in which future and past are 
united indivisibly in the present, or time of “enpresenting,” i.e., the “flash of the eye,” or 
Augenblick (Heidegger 1962). It is interesting to note that Barthes refers to the kairos as the 
“unexpected flash.” Common to all of these thinkers is the kindred notion of the kairos 
representing the moment in which the human is trust into a unique relationship with time, which 
transcends the common understanding and experience of time and the world.  
 However, both Barthes and Heidegger are concerned with doing ontology: the essence of 
photography (with its own unique time) and Time (as ecstatic temporality), respectively. We are 
concerned with understanding the time in which we experience the meaning of Sherman’s art as 
spectators. If there is something present to Cindy Sherman’s photographs that seizes us and 
transports us temporally, I argue that it is not, as in Heidegger and Barthes, either a fundamental 
mode of attunement (the mood of Angst) or a distinct, “photographic referent” that manifests its 
intimate relationship to the time that has-been (the past). Rather, is it a kairotic opening created 
in great part by the formal, cinematic elements Sherman has chosen to incorporate into her 
photographs, as outlined previously by Schjedahl, working in concert with the “look” of the 
subject set within the cinematic tableau of the photos, which also includes, most importantly, the 
subject as envisaged within the narrative context of an imaginary, fictionalized Hollywood 
drama.  
 The kairotic moment of Sherman’s photographs is best conceived as a mechanical 
derivative of essential time (the ontological nature of time) and everyday time, or “world time” 
(ontic time). As opposed to “real time,”  it is best referred to as “reel-time,” or time-of-the-
cinema. For it is a time that has been manufactured exclusively for creating and perpetuating the 
spectator’s consciousness of fiction, the way we have, as spectators, acquired the consciousness 
for understanding the “story-film,” with its truncated, imitative re-presentation of events within 
time. When describing the characters in Sherman’s photographs, in a telling statement, art critic 
Andy Grundberg writes, “The net effect is a non-specific characterization that tempts one to 
speculate about the situation and mood of the female protagonists” (Grundberg 1981). In short, 
we are sutured into the photographs, drawn in as participants within her single-frame “stories,” 
and this is why it possible for us to become so genuinely concerned for the women that Sherman 
portrays, and to subsequently experience stimulation and pleasure through our intense 
involvement with the fictional scenarios of the Centerfolds, scenarios that we as participants in 
great part create through our imaginative involvement in Sherman’s art. Thus, with great 
concern, we find ourselves speculating on the “situation” that each woman finds herself in 
(present), what events may have led up to this point, or situation (past), and what events might 
occur to rectify this situation (future). 
 
3. The Formal Properties of Narrative Logic and Consciousness 
The narrative structure of film organizes the spacial and temporal elements, based on the logic of 
cause and effect (and the principle of sufficient reason) into a causal chain of events. The time 
that is specific to the narrative film has been described by Todorov as circular in nature (recall 
that for Barthes the essence of the photograph is based on a model of time that is linear and for 
Heidegger time is conceived as elliptical). In representing what is depicted in the film, the action, 
events, characters (the plot), the mechanism of narrative functions in three distinct phases: (1) a 
state of initial harmony or equilibrium exists which is disrupted by (2) a catastrophic event that 
serves to destroy the initial state of  harmony, and this is the element of dissonance in the film, 
which is then rectified and marked out by (3) a return to a state of harmony or equilibrium, i.e., a 
moment of consonance resolves the problem, conflict, or the element of dissonance in the plot. 
 This notion of conflict and conflict-resolution is expressed by Nietzsche in The Birth of 
Tragedy as two pinnacle components in the unfolding of the tragic plot, which arouses in the 
spectator the experience of pleasure-cum-pain, and for Nietzsche, this expresses both the 
Apolline and Dionysiac elements at work in Greek theater of the “tragic age.” This dramatic 
phenomenon as philosophized by Nietzsche is expressed succinctly by Silk and Stern in the 
following manner: 
  
The essential character of dissonance, therefore, is that it evokes a need for resolution 
which it cannot itself satisfy. Since it does not satisfy the need, it evokes the feeling of 
pain, and since it is without resolution, it invokes infinitude. It is consonance, resolution, 
that removes the pain by imposing limits. Dissonance therefore, is Dionysiac; 
consonance, Apolline” (Silk & Stern 1981).   
             
Interestingly, we first encounter Sherman’s fictional female protagonists in medias res - “in the 
middle of things” - which is to say, in the second phase of the narrative cycle, during which time 
a radical break from normalcy has occurred. This is the so-called “liminal,” or critical, stage in 
the transition of the events. At this juncture, we have witnessed a problematic disruption to the 
equilibrium of the film’s events, and now anticipate the eventual resolution of the problem. This 
adds a sense of immediacy and cinematic drama to the photos as the spectator enters the “filmic” 
world conjured by Sherman’s formal production techniques at the moment of a disjunctive state 
of crisis, which induces a pervasive sense of uneasiness, agitation, and anxiety in the spectator. 
Noting the disheveled physical and disturbed mental states that the women are experiencing, 
Roberta Smith points out that in every one of the centerfolds, to a greater or lesser degree, some 
sort of disruption to their life has occurred. 
 
These women are depressed, dreaming, wanting, fantasizing, thinking, sulking 
[...] Some images have disturbing details: a torn piece of newspaper clutched in 
the hand of a plaid-skirted blonde sprawled on linoleum; the wet hair of a fully 
clothed crouching woman, another’s infantile grip of a blanket, an unusually 
sweated t-short, black shorts. In others the disturbance is more internalized. Either 
way it is always there (Smith 1981).   
 
 For example, when confronted with the women in Untitled # 93, we are drawn into the 
kairotic time of Sherman’s single-frame film, when all the elements of her mock-cinematic 
staging are operative. Recall Schjeldahl’s previous description wherein the spectator encounters 
“widescreen proportions, high-angle midshot compositions, ‘classy’ cinematographic lighting, 
punched up color, and the look of Method acting.” As he rightly concludes, “The photos function 
as the passive container of the complete fictionalized reality,”and in the moment, we stand 
outside our everyday ways of conceptualizing the world and time, we are at once transported, in 
an ecstatic flash, into the fictional world of the protagonist - a character with a past, present, and 
future (Schjeldahl 1990, p. 128). We are reflecting and then projecting our imagination from that 
initial “liminal” moment where we find her in bed, presumably post coitus, humiliated and 
vulnerable, through the various phases of the narrative cycle. We long to know where she has 
come from and where she might be going after this erotic, and perhaps, violent (at least in the 
psychological sense) sexual encounter.   
 She is dripping sweat, clad in a long, lace nightgown, drawing up the covers in such a 
way to suggest intense shame for what has just occurred in the sweltering confines of the 
bedroom. She has given herself, but not without trepidation, to a man who has just proven 
himself unworthy of her love. Reverie this is not, and through Sherman’s use of omniscient 
narration, the spectator, as voyeur, feels the man’s presence, intuits his gaze which transforms 
her into the object of his sexual desires. The spectator experiences the lingering and hauntingly 
oppressive presence of the male at the exclusion of his appearance, due in fact to his conspicuous 
absence. The man, lingering just outside of the frame, in a literal and figurative manner, casts his 
glance down on her from above.  
 She pursued this man against the advice of her well-meaning friends, against their 
persistent warnings that this “wild one” had nothing valuable to offer, only the potential for pain 
and anguish. She ignored the clarity and logic of their advice, for her heart cried out, and she 
recklessly heeded its beckoning, and now she was paying the ultimate price. Now, in this 
moment of crisis, the “liminal” moment of the narrative, she feels vulnerable, violated, and 
ashamed, she knows that any hope for a meaningful and lasting relationship has evaporated. If 
indeed this scenario were occurring in a typical Hollywood film of the 1950s and 1960s, 
harmony would more than likely be restored to this young woman’s troubled life in the final reel, 
in time she would eventually find happiness. However, as I have argued, when experiencing the 
immediacy of Sherman’s photographs we are not privy to the artful handy work of Hollywood 
film-making, rather we are called to the task of providing the final reel, so-to-speak, with the 
concluding scene by way of invention and imagination. In short, when confronting the 
Centerfolds we are experiencing, in a participatory sense, what Nietzsche termed the “dissonant” 
moment of the plot’s rupture to which we must bring a sense of closure, of resolution, or 
“consonance.” 
 Time and again critics have commented, and rightly so, on the seemingly paradoxical 
nature of Sherman’s women: they are at once ambiguous and yet somehow strikingly familiar. 
We have been denied the opportunity to encounter any of the “centerfolds” in a full-length 
Hollywood melodrama, in which we trace the character’s development, e.g., coming to know the 
protagonist in the same way as any of Elizabeth Taylor’s characters in such film as National 
Velvet, Butterfield 8, or Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?  However, perhaps we know these 
centerfolds in an even more powerful and primordial sense of identification, i.e., in terms of 
modern Jungian archetypes, which reside in a latent state as part of a “modern” collective 
unconscious, which has been formed as a result of our contact with and immersion in the many 
and varied modes of mass media in the modern technological age, with television and cinema 
being perhaps the most dominant and prevalent technological sources of representational 
imagery.    
 According to Jung, archetypes produce a wide variety of psychic forms, and one way in 
which the material demonstrating these forms manifests is within dreams. Archetypes are 
involuntary and spontaneous products of the unconscious psyche. Certainly, the cinema’s power 
to re-produce both the environment and the logic of the dreamer has been well-documented (e.g., 
Jean Goudal’s “Surrealism and Cinema,” 1925), for cinema is analogous to the dream. 
According to Grundberg, Sherman’s photography, “creates a series of dramatic personae (or, in 
Jung’s psychological version of the word’s plural, personas), each with its own aura, its own 
particular presence” (Grunberg 1981). Building on Grunberg’s observations, we might argue that 
in the postmodern landscape of pop culture and cinematic iconography, we might include to 
Jung’s child, trickster, God, daimon, mother, father, wise man, the “Hollywood Starlet, the 
suburban housewife, the sexually curious and libidinous Catholic school girl, the pubescent 
bobby-soxer,” to name but a few archetypes that we encounter in Sherman’s work (Grunberg 
1981). In fact, Jung himself clearly opens the possibility for this very line of speculation, in “The 
Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious” when he writes,   
 
There are as many archetypes as there are typical situations in life. Endless 
repetition has engendered these experiences into our psychic constitution. Not in 
the forms of images filled with content, but at first only as forms without content, 
representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action (Jung 
1936). 
 
In addition, such a conception as stated above is explicitly outlined by Jung in Flying Saucers: A 
Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Sky, wherein he speculates on the intersection of modern, 
“space age” technology and the archetypes. Technology, Jung concludes, holds the power to 
influence and actualize the meaning potential of the archetypes associated specifically with 
religion, e.g., the mandala, the image of psychic totality found recurring in various mythologies 
is related to God and the immortal soul. 
 Sherman’s women are “ambiguous” because they are part of a reservoir of latent 
archetypal images, they do not form clear and distinct representations, they are nameless, they 
are not explicitly known as familiar, particular individuals, they are not understood as fully 
developed pictures in the mind. Rather, they are more reminiscent of the ghost-like negatives of 
photos waiting for the spectator to bring her unique “psychic content” to the photographic text in 
order to fully develop them, i.e., to enact their latent potential to communicate in a personal and 
highly visceral manner. The “familiarity” of these women is linked with the fact that their full 
development and expression requires the spectator’s unique experiences, and this too, we might 
associate with the pleasure (jouissance) that enraptures the spectator as a participant in 
Sherman’s art work.    
  
III. Concluding Remarks 
 
It has been the aim of this essay to explore Sherman’s ability as artist to uniquely re-present 
elements of the modern cinematic experience within her photographs, incorporating both micro 
and macro elements of the film-making process, and further, to specular on why the Centerfolds 
continue to exercise such a powerful hold on us, why they continue to enthrall us after all this 
time. For this analysis, I have focused on the mechanism of narrative structure in cinema for two 
reasons. First, the obvious, it is the most common form or genre of cinema with which we are 
acquainted. Second, because narrative is not only a mechanism employed in literature or film, 
beyond this, according to Andrew, “it is the innate capability, like language itself, which surfaces 
in many areas of human life and is dominant in the sense of these. Narrative competence holds 
our signification in place to give them order and thrust” (Andrew 1984).   
 Andrew argues that the power of narrative cinema is grounded originally in the fact that 
the mechanism of “narrative” is a unique category of the rational mind. He claims that it is the 
innate capability to order the world by structuring the chaotic flux and flow of brute sensory 
stimuli. It is present in nearly all of our communications and a wide variety of arts depend for 
their immediacy and meaning on this temporal logic of cause-and-effect. If what I have 
suggested is accurate, we might add to the list of arts that affect us so dramatically because they 
rely in varying degrees on narrative structure (e.g., painting, dance, opera, literature, and the 
cinema), the unique photography of Cindy Sherman’s Centerfolds, a form of photography that 
gathers and acquires its power to deeply and profoundly move us because it functions in an 
analogous manner to narrative cinema, as single-frame film-making. 
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